A risk assessment model for selecting cloud service providers by unknown
Journal of Cloud Computing:
Advances, Systems and Applications
Cayirci et al. Journal of Cloud Computing: Advances, Systems
and Applications  (2016) 5:14 
DOI 10.1186/s13677-016-0064-x
RESEARCH Open Access
A risk assessment model for selecting
cloud service providers
Erdal Cayirci1, Alexandr Garaga2,3, Anderson Santana de Oliveira2* and Yves Roudier3
Abstract
The Cloud Adoption Risk Assessment Model is designed to help cloud customers in assessing the risks that they face
by selecting a specific cloud service provider. It evaluates background information obtained from cloud customers
and cloud service providers to analyze various risk scenarios. This facilitates decision making an selecting the cloud
service provider with the most preferable risk profile based on aggregated risks to security, privacy, and service
delivery. Based on this model we developed a prototype using machine learning to automatically analyze the risks of
representative cloud service providers from the Cloud Security Alliance Security, Trust & Assurance Registry.
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Introduction
Moving business processes to the cloud is associated
with a change in the risk landscape to an organiza-
tion [1]. Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) [2] has found
that insufficient due diligence was among the top threats
in cloud computing in 2013. This threat is linked to
the fact that organizations which strive to adopt cloud
computing often do not understand well the resulting
risks.
Regulations related to data protection, financial report-
ing, etc. put certain requirements that should be complied
with even when outsourcing business processes to 3rd
parties, like cloud service providers (CSPs). For example,
EUData ProtectionDirective, in particular Article 29Data
Protection Working Party [3] recommends that all data
controllers (usually corporate cloud customers) perform
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an impact assessment of moving personal data of their
clients to the cloud.
However, most of the cloud service customers (CSCs),
especially Small-Medium Businesses (SMBs), may not
have enough knowledge in performing such assessments
at a good level, because they may not necessarily employ
IT specialists and the lack of transparency is intrinsic to
the operations of the CSPs. This makes difficult to choose
an appropriate CSP based on CSC’s security require-
ments, especially considering the abundance of similar
cloud offerings [4].
This work proposes a methodology, cloud adoption
risk assessment model (CARAM), to help in assessing
the various risks to business, security and privacy that
CSCs face when moving to the cloud by leveraging infor-
mation from CSCs, CSPs and several public sources.
CARAM consists of the following tools that complement
the various recommendations from European Network
and Information Security Agency (ENISA) [1], and Cloud
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Security Alliance (CSA) for a complete risk assessment
framework:
• A questionnaire for CSCs
• A tool and an algorithm to classify the answers to
Cloud Assessment Initiative Questionnaire (CAIQ)
to discrete values
• A model that maps the answers to both
questionnaires to risk values
• A multi-criteria decision approach with posterior
articulation of CSC preferences for relative risk
analysis, using a few parameters for security, privacy
and quality of service, allowing to to quickly and
reliably compare multiple CSPs
This paper extends our work in [5] with experimental
results - we devised profiles representing realistic cus-
tomer categories to classify providers according to the
CSC needs. We also used a more precise risk scale for
comparing CSPs, allowing one to visualize the differences
in security practices of the most representative players in
the cloud services landscape. Therefore the current ver-
sion brings significative improvements with respect to the
previous paper [5].
In Section “Related work” we elaborate on the literature
related to the risk assessment for adoption of cloud com-
puting: we focus on the work carried out by ENISA and
CSA because CARAM is based on them; In Section “Risk
levels computation” we introduce CARAM, and then a
multi-criteria risk assessment approach with posterior
articulation of the CSCs; In Section “Experimental results”
we demonstrate experimental results from using CARAM
on a case study; In Section “Limitations” we outline some
limitations of the approach; We conclude our paper in
Section “Conclusion”.
Related work
Several large standardization bodies such as International
Organization for Standardization (ISO), International
Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and National Insti-
tute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and Information
Technology (IT) Governance Institute and the Informa-
tion Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA)
published standards on IT risk management and risk
assessment: ISO 31000 [6], ISO/IEC 31010 [7], ISO/IEC
27005 [8], NIST SP 800-30 [9], SP 800-37 [10] and
COBIT [11]. All these standards are generic i.e. not spe-
cific to cloud deployments, and while possible to use them
for evaluating different cloud solutions, it will require
a considerable amount of effort and expert knowledge,
which SMBs cannot always afford.
Some adaptations of these standards were developed
specifically for cloud deployments. E.g. Microsoft pro-
posed a Cloud Decision Framework [12] based on ISO
31000. It provides guidance for risk assessment to be
performed by potential CSCs when choosing a cloud solu-
tion. The risk profiles of different cloud solutions are
constructed based on a predefined set of risks from four
categories: compliance, strategic, operational and mar-
ket and finance. The authors suggest using CSA Cloud
Control Matrix (CCM) [13] as guidance for evaluating
mitigating controls. While this approach could be more
practical than other generic risk assessment frameworks
for evaluating different cloud solutions it is still quite
abstract and largely rely on experts’ opinions for estimat-
ing and evaluating the risks and mitigations. In contrast,
we propose a concrete step by step approach to automate
the estimation and evaluation of risks of adopting different
cloud solutions. This could be more suitable for smaller
organizations that lack sufficient resources for a full-scale
risk assessment.
ENISA [1] provided recommendations and a frame-
work for generic qualitative inductive risk assessment for
cloud computing. Their recommendations include exten-
sive lists of possible incident scenarios, assets and vul-
nerabilities in cloud computing deployments. It suggests
estimating risk levels on the basis of likelihood of a risk
scenario mapped against the estimated negative impact,
which is the essence of the risk formulation by also many
others in the literature [7, 11, 14, 15]. Although ENISA’s
recommendations are specific for cloud computing, it is
a generic framework that does not provide an approach
to map the specifics of CSPs and CSCs to the 35 risk
scenarios listed in the report [1]. In Section “Risk levels
computation” we describe how CARAM fine-tunes this
approach to estimate risk values based on some known
information about CSCs and CSPs.
Another qualitative inductive scheme was published
by “The Commission nationale de l’informatique et des
libertés” (CNIL) or in English: The French National Com-
mission on Informatics and Liberty [16] more recently.
CNIL’s methodology is similar to the ENISA’s frame-
work with the following difference: it is a risk assessment
focused on privacy risks in cloud computing. It also rec-
ommends measures to reduce the risks and assess the
residual privacy risks after the application of these mea-
sures. However, it is still generic and does not account for
specific requirements of CSPs or CSCs.
The CSA Cloud Assessment Initiative Questionnaire
(CAIQ) [17] is a questionnaire prepared for CSPs to doc-
ument the implemented security measures. It is based
on the CSA Cloud Control Matrix (CCM) taxonomy of
security controls [13] and is aimed to help CSCs under-
stand the security coverage of specific cloud offerings
in relation to popular security standards, control frame-
works and regulations. The questionnaires answered by
many CSPs are publicly available in the CSA Security,
Trust and Assurance Registry (STAR) [4]. We propose a
methodology that uses the data extracted from STAR to
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evaluate the implementation of various controls provided
by cloud solutions (see Subsection “The vulnerability
parameter for a CSP”).
Luna et al. introduced in [18] Cloud Security Level
Agreements (SecLA) and proposed a methodology to
benchmark SecLA of CSPs with respect to CSCs’ require-
ments [19]. Both CSP SecLA provisions and user require-
ments are expressed using a special data structure: Quan-
titative Policy Trees, allowing expressing controls with
different granularity: CCM control areas, control groups,
and controls (corresponding to CAIQ answers). The
authors demonstrate their approach using data on several
CSPs from STAR, by calculating security levels for respec-
tive controls and control groups. While similar in the
intent CARAM is a model for risk assessment, while [19]
proposes a ranking algorithm for matching CSC require-
ments vs. CSP provisions. In [19] CSCs need a certain level
of security expertise to specify their requirements, while
in CARAM this is not necessary: CSCs only need to spec-
ify acceptable risk levels for security, privacy and service
categories, while still allowing a more fine grained spec-
ification. Another major difference is that [19] assumes
the existence of a mapping from provisions to quantita-
tive Local Security Levels to allow further analysis. Given a
high number of potential CSPs and controls for each CSP
creating this mapping would require significant manual
work. In CARAMwe propose a way to automatically con-
struct such a mapping (see Subsection “The vulnerability
parameter for a CSP”).
Habib et al. proposed a multi-faceted Trust Manage-
ment system architecture for a cloud computing mar-
ketplace [20]. The system evaluates the trustworthiness
of CSPs in terms of different SLA attributes assessed
using information collected frommultiple sources. This is
done by evaluating opinions related to SLA attributes and
aggregating them into a trust score for a CSP. The authors
mention CAIQ answers as a source of information, how-
ever they do not specify how exactly the CSP trust score
is computed from the answers, especially considering that
the answers are in free text form.
In [21], the EU funded project SECCRIT enumerated
very relevant cloud risk scenarios systematically, in a sim-
ilar fashion to what ENISA [1] did a few years earlier, but
this time they evaluated the risk perception from the users
point of view. They used a survey-based methodology to
ask respondents to rank risks in a standard way - assess-
ing probability and impact. CARAM is innovative when
compared with this approach in two ways: it is using real
information disclosed by cloud providers to estimate the
likelihood of threats affecting the cloud would become
concrete. Second, it allows the user of the methodology to
focus on what they know best, their assets: the methodol-
ogy only requires to assign priorities to assets in order to
provide quantifiable risk information.
Other EU projects such as SPECS [22] and Escudo-
Cloud [23] also looked at quantifying the capacity of
a given cloud provider to satisfy security Servive Level
Agreements (SLAs) using information published in the
CSA STAR registry. It also has a focus on usability, but
the endeavour is different in essence. Here we are assess-
ing risk scenarios in an automated way, whereas in that
work [23] does not provide an automated processing for
the answers given by the CSPs to the CAIQ, making it
difficult to compare more than three providers quickly.
Joint Risk and Trust Model (JRTM) [24] was developed
by Accountability for Cloud and Other Future Internet
Services Project (A4Cloud). JRTM is a quantitative risk
assessment model that assesses the cloud service security
and privacy risks for a specific CSP and CSC. It counts on
a third party (i.e., a Trust as a Service Provider) to accumu-
late statistical data (i.e., evidence) on the trustworthiness
of CSPs. These evidences include the number of security,
privacy and service events that a CSP was subject to and
the percentage of the events that the CSP recovered from
before they become an incident (i.e., they impact on CSC).
However, such detailed statistical data is not always avail-
able and even if available they will not be normally shared
with (potential) CSCs—hence the need for a trusted third
party. In this work, instead, we rely on public information
already provided by CSPs regarding their implementation
of various security controls for a qualitative risk assess-
ment of their solutions. This can be considered as an
extension of JRTM when statistical data is available or a
substitution otherwise.
One of the main advantages of CARAM is that it is
easy to make it evolve to cover further risk scenarios
and to make it evolve if the security control frameworks
evolve. As we will introduce in the next section, the risk
level computation is parametrized by mappings between
threats and security controls that help to mitigate them,
making the approach relevant over time.
Risk levels computation
ENISA [1] identified 35 incident scenarios that fall in
one of the following four categories: policy and organiza-
tional, technical, legal and the other scenarios not specific
to cloud computing (see Table 1). The likelihood of each
of these scenarios and their business impact are deter-
mined in consultation with an expert group. The scale of
probability and impact has five discrete classes between
very low and very high. For example, the probability and
impact of Incident Scenario P1 in “Policy and Organiza-
tional Scenarios” category (i.e., lock-in) are given as HIGH
and MEDIUM relatively.
ENISA also provides a list of 53 vulnerabilities (i.e., 31
cloud specific and 22 not cloud specific vulnerabilities, see
Table 2) and 23 classes of CSC assets (see Table 3) that
may be affected by the cloud adoption. Each of 35 incident
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Table 1 ENISA’s list of risk scenarios and their categories
Risk category Risk name
Policy & Organizational P1. Lock-in
P2. Loss of governance
P3. Compliance challenges
P4. Loss of business reputation due to
co-tenant activities
P5. Cloud service termination or failure
P6. Cloud provider acquisition
P7. Supply chain failure
Technical T1. Resource exhaustion (under or over
provisioning)
T2. Isolation failure
T3. Cloud provider malicious insider - abuse
of high privilege roles
T4. Management interface compromise
(manipulation, availability of infrastructure)
T5. Intercepting data in transit
T6. Data leakage on up/download,
intra-cloud
T7. Insecure or ineffective deletion of data
T8. Distributed denial of service (DDoS)
T9. Economic denial of service (EDOS)
T10. Loss of encryption keys
T11. Undertaking malicious probes or scans
T12. Compromise service engine
T13. Conflicts between customer hardening
procedures and cloud environment
Legal L1. Subpoena and e-discovery
L2. Risk from changes of jurisdiction
L3. Data protection risks
L4. Licensing risks
Not Specific to the Cloud N1. Network breaks
N2. Network management (ie, network
congestion / mis-connection / non-optimal
use)
N3. Modifying network traffic
N4. Privilege escalation
N5. Social engineering attacks (ie,
impersonation)
N6. Loss or compromise of operational logs
N7. Loss or compromise of security logs
(manipulation of forensic investigation)
N8. Backups lost, stolen
N9. Unauthorized access to premises
(including physical access to machines and
other facilities)
N10. Theft of computer equipment
N11. Natural disasters
Table 2 ENISA’s list of vulnerabilities
Cloud specific vulnerabilities
V1. Authentication Authorization Accounting (AAA) vulnerabilities
V2. User provisioning vulnerabilities
V3. User de-provisioning vulnerabilities
V4. Remote access to management interface
V5. Hypervisor vulnerabilities
V6. Lack of resource isolation
V7. Lack of reputational isolation
V8. Communication encryption vulnerabilities
V9. Lack of or weak encryption of archives and data in transit
V10. Impossibility of processing data in encrypted form
V11. Poor key management procedures
V12. Key generation: low entropy for random number generation
V13. Lack of standard technologies and solutions
V14. No source escrow agreement
V15. Inaccurate modelling of resource
V16. No control on vulnerability assessment process
V17. Possibility that internal (cloud) network probing will occur
V18. Possibility that co-residence checks will be performed
V19. Lack of forensic readiness
V20. Sensitive media sanitization
V21. Synchronizing responsibilities or contractual obligations
external to cloud
V22. Cross-cloud applications creating hidden dependency
V23. SLA clauses with conflicting promises to different stakeholders
V24. SLA clauses containing excessive business risk
V25. Audit or certification not available to customers
V26. Certification schemes not adapted to cloud infrastructures
V27. Inadequate resource provisioning and investments in
infrastructure
V28. No policies for resource capping
V29. Storage of data in multiple jurisdictions and lack of transparency
about this
V30. Lack of information on jurisdictions
V31. Lack of completeness and transparency in terms of use
Vulnerabilities not specific to the cloud
V32. Lack of security awareness
V33. Lack of vetting processes
V34. Unclear roles and responsibilities
V35. Poor enforcement of role definitions
V36. Need-to-know principle not applied
V37. Inadequate physical security procedures
V38. Misconfiguration
V39. System or OS vulnerabilities
V40. Untrusted software
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Table 2 ENISA’s list of vulnerabilities (Continued)
V41. Lack of, or a poor and untested, business continuity and disaster
recovery plan
V42. Lack of, or incomplete or inaccurate, asset inventory
V43. Lack of, or poor or inadequate, asset classification
V44. Unclear asset ownership
V45. Poor identification of project requirements
V46. Poor provider selection
V47. Lack of supplier redundancy
V48. Application vulnerabilities or poor patch management
V49. Resource consumption vulnerabilities
V50. Breach of NDA by provider
V51. Liability from data loss
V52. Lack of policy or poor procedures for logs collection and
retention
V53. Inadequate or misconfigured filtering resources
scenarios is related with a subset of vulnerabilities and
assets. For example, the Incident Scenario P1 is related
to Vulnerabilities V13 (lack of standard technologies and
solutions), V31 (lack of completeness and transparency in
terms of use), V46 (poor provider selection), V47 (lack
Table 3 ENISA’s list of assets
A1. Company reputation
A2. Customer trust
A3. Employee loyalty and experience
A4. Intellectual property
A5. Personal sensitive data
A6. Personal data
A7. Personal data - critical
A8. HR data
A9. Service delivery - real time services
A10. Service delivery
A11. Access control / authentication / authorization (root/admin v others)
A12. Credentials
A13. User directory (data)
A14. Cloud service management interface
A15. Management interface APIs
A16. Network (connections, etc.)
A17. Physical hardware
A18. Physical buildings
A19. Cloud Provider Application (source code)
A20. Certification
A21. Operational logs (customer and cloud provider)
A22. Security logs
A23. Backup or archive data
of supplier redundancy) and Assets A1 (company repu-
tation), A5 (personal sensitive data), A6 (personal data),
A7 (personal data critical), A9 (service delivery - real time
services), A10 (service delivery).
The likelihood and business impact values that are
determined by the experts are converted to the risk lev-
els for each incident scenario based on a risk matrix
with a scale between 0 and 8 as shown in Fig. 1. Then,





Hence, a CSC can assess the risk level related to an inci-
dent scenario qualitatively and understands what kind of
vulnerabilities and assets are related to each scenario by
examining [1]. These values represent educated guesses
over a wide range of common cloud deployments and do
not have a precise semantics. In practice, the risk levels
are related to many factors such as the security controls
that CSPs implement and the concerned assets of the spe-
cific users. Therefore, a generic value cannot be applied to
all CSPs and CSCs. Although vulnerabilities and assets for
each incident scenario are given by the ENISA framework,
it does not describe how those values can be adapted for
a specific CSP and CSC pair. CARAM fills this gap. For
that, first the qualitative scale used by ENISA as probabil-
ity and impact values are mapped to a quantitative scale as
follows:




Very high → 5
For example, probability P1 and impact I1 values for
the first scenario (i.e., lock in) is HIGH and MEDIUM
respectively. We map these values as follows: P1 = 4 and
I1 = 3.
To compute the risk levels considering particular vul-
nerabilities and assets involved CARAM adjusts the val-
ues from ENISA, taken as a baseline, taking into account
Probability
very high 4 5 6 7 8
high 3 4 5 6 7
medium 2 3 4 5 6
low 1 2 3 4 5
very low 0 1 2 3 4
very 
low
low medium high very 
high
impact
Fig. 1 ENISA definition of risk levels
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additional information about the cloud service. For that,
we use Eqs. 1 and 2:
βi = Pi × νi (1)
δi = Ii × αi (2)
In Eq. 1, for the risk scenario i, βi is the adjusted proba-
bility, νi is the vulnerability index of a given CSP, δi is the
adjusted impact and αi is the asset index for a given CSC.
Here we assume that probability and impact of an incident
are proportional to the number of non-addressed vulnera-
bilities by a CSP; and impact is proportional to the number
of CSC assets related to a risk scenario.
Note that vulnerability index of a CSP is the same for
all CSCs and the asset index of a CSC is the same for
all CSPs. Vulnerability and asset indices are calculated as
given in Eqs. 3 and 4 respectively, where νki = 1 if vulner-
ability k is in the list of vulnerabilities [1] for risk scenario
i, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, αki = 1 if asset k is in the
list of assets [1] for risk scenario i. Please note again that
there are 53 vulnerabilities (see Table 2) and 23 assets (see
Table 3) listed in [1]. The vulnerability related parameter
k in Eq. 3 is derived from the answers to CAIQ, and elab-
orated on later in Subsection “The vulnerability parameter
for a CSP”. The asset related parameter γk in Eq. 4 is given
value 0 if the CSC’s answer to the question “Does the
service that you seek will involve any asset of yours that














We would like to highlight that CARAM is independent
from the number of incident scenarios and probability,
impact, vulnerability and assets assigned to the incident
scenarios. Moreover, it is possible to assign weight values
for each of assets and vulnerabilities if some of them are
assumed as of higher importance comparing to the others.
The vulnerability parameter for a CSP
We use CSPs’ responses to CAIQ from [4] to assign a
value to the vulnerability related parameter k . Most of
the entries in STAR are using the CAIQ v1.1 template [25]
that provides 148 questions grouped into the control areas
shown in Table 4 covering the state of implementation of
security controls.
The v1.1 template accepts a free text answer in con-
trast to the newer v3.0.1 template where the CSPs are
expected to choose their answers between “Yes”, “No” and
Table 4 The control areas in CAIQ
Compliance (CO) Operations Management (OP)
Data Governance (DG) Risk Management (RI)
Facility Security (FS) Release Management (RM)
Human Resources Security (HR) Resiliency (RS)
Information Security (IS) Security Architecture (SA)
Legal (LG)
“Not applicable”. This makes the answers unsuitable for
automated analysis. We proposed a mechanism to map
the answers given to the questions in CAIQ to one of the
control implementation status categories in Table 5.
The category Implemented has a positive meaning (the
control is in place), but the answer “Yes” to a CAIQ
question does not always imply a more secure system.
For example, the “Yes” answer to CAIQ Question RS06-
01 “Are any of your data centers located in places which
have a high probability/occurrence of high-impact environ-
mental risks (floods, tornadoes, earthquakes, hurricanes,
etc.)?” implies a negative outcome, which means the con-
trol is not implemented. In such cases we classify the
“Yes” answer as Not Implemented and the “No” answer as
Implemented.
We analyzed 44 out of 70 CSPs from the mentioned reg-
istry providing answers to about 200 questions each. To be
included in the selection a provider had to fill in the CAIQ
questionnaire in the format provided by CSA (to enable
automated processing). The responses of some of the big
CSPs (e.g. Amazon, HP, Microsoft, RedHat, or SAP1) who
provided answers in other forms, though, were processed
manually to ensure the consideration of the major players.
Given the workload, we decided to automate the classifi-
cation of the free text answers to CAIQ questions using
the supervised machine learning algorithms (sequential
minimal optimization and string vectorization) provided
by the WEKA tool [26]. We created a training set from
a random sampling of around 300 manually classified
answers out of overall circa 9000 answers and used it to
classify the other remaining answers. The 10-fold cross-
validation provided an accuracy of around 84 % of cor-
rectly classified instances, which we consider enough for
our purpose.
Table 5 The categorization of the answers given to the
questions in CAIQ
Implemented the control is in place
Conditionally implemented the control can be implemented under
some conditions
Not implemented the control is not in place
Not applicable the control is not applicable to the
provided service
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After classification of the answers to one of the cate-
gories in Table 5, the implementation value qm is assigned
for each of the controls identified by questionm:
• Implemented → qm = 0: the related vulnerabilities
are mitigated
• Not Applicable → qm = 0: these controls do not
impact the risk value
• No → qm = 1: the related vulnerabilities are not
mitigated
• Conditionally Implemented → the CSC needs to
clarify with the CSP if the control can be
implemented. If yes, qm = 0. Otherwise, qm = 1.
When qm is known for a CSP and a CSC, Eq. 5 gives
the vulnerability related parameter k for the CSP and the




m=1 rmk × qm∑n
m=1 rmk × bm
(5)
In Eq. 5, n is the number of questions in CAIQ. rmk is the
mapping of the CAIQ questions to vulnerabilities: it is 1 if
the control representing the questionmmitigates the vul-
nerability k, and 0 otherwise (see Table 6 for an example
mapping excerpt and Additional file 1 — Mapping CAIQ
questions to vulnerabilities.xlsx for the full mapping).
Finally, bm = 0 if the answer to the question m is “Not
Applicable” and 1 otherwise. This allows discarding the
unrelated questions to avoid wrongly penalizing the CSPs.
In Eq. 5 k receives a minimum value 0 if all the con-
trols related to the vulnerability k are implemented and
hence the vulnerability does not impact negatively the risk
Table 6 Mapping rmk of CAIQ questions to ENISA vulnerabilities
(excerpt)
Control group Vulnerabilities mitigated
Audit Planning CO-01 V02, V03, V13, V14, V16, V23, V25, V26, V27,
V29, V33, V35, V50
Independent Audits CO-02 V02, V03, V13, V14, V16, V23, V25, V26, V27,
V29, V33, V35, V50
Third Party Audits CO-03 V02, V03, V13, V14, V16, V23, V25, V26, V27,
V29, V33, V35, V50
Contact/Authority
Maintenance CO-04
V14, V21, V29, V30
Information System
Regulatory Mapping CO-05
V07, V08, V09, V10
Intellectual Property CO-06 V34, V31, V35, V44
Intellectual Property CO-07 V34, V31, V35, V44
Intellectual Property CO-08 V34, V31, V35, V44
values. The more controls related to the vulnerability k
are not implemented, the higher k is. Its maximum value
is 1, which means the CSP has no measures against the
vulnerability k.
Relative risk assessment-based CSP selection
ENISA’s risk assessment model is based on 35 incident
scenarios. These numerous risks make it difficult for
customers to meaningfully compare multiple providers.
Therefore, we first reduce the number of criteria from
these 35 incident scenarios to three categories of cloud
risks: security, privacy and service [24]. For that, we com-
pute the probability that a privacy (βr), a security (βs)
and a service (βe) incident can occur and the impact of
a privacy (δr), a security (δs) and a service (δe) incident
by applying Eqs. 6 to 11. In Eqs. 6 and 9, ri = 1 if
ENISA incident scenario i is related to privacy, and 0 oth-
erwise (see Table 7 for an example mapping). ωri and αri
are real numbers between 0 and 1. They are the weight
factors for probability and impact respectively. The sig-
nificance of every scenario may not be the same when
calculating an aggregated value for privacy, security and
service incidents. Moreover, the scenarios may need to
be treated differently for each CSC especially when cal-
culating the aggregated impact values. The weight factors
are for making these adjustments. If the significance of
each scenario is the same, then the weight factors can be
assigned 1. Similar to ri, si and ei are the mapping values
for security and service risks respectively (see Table 7).
ωsi and αsi are the weight factors for security scenar-




i=1 βi × ri × ωri
∑35




i=1 βi × si × ωsi
∑35




i=1 βi × ei × ωei
∑35




i=1 δi × ri × αri
∑35




i=1 δi × si × αsi
∑35




i=1 δi × ei × αei
∑35
i=1 ei × αei
(11)
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Table 7 Mapping (ri , si , ei) of ENISA risk scenarios to risk categories
Risk scenario i Privacy ri Security si Service ei
P1 0 0 1
P2 1 0 0
P3 1 1 1
P4 0 1 0
P5 0 0 1
P6 1 1 1
P7 0 0 1
T1 0 0 1
T2 1 1 0
T3 1 1 1
T4 1 1 1
T5 1 1 0
T6 1 1 0
T7 1 1 0
T8 0 0 1
T9 0 0 1
T10 1 1 0
T11 1 1 0
T12 1 1 1
T13 0 1 0
L1 1 1 0
L2 1 0 0
L3 1 1 0
L4 0 0 1
N1 0 0 1
N2 0 0 1
N3 0 0 1
N4 1 1 1
N5 0 1 0
N6 0 1 1
N7 0 1 1
N8 1 1 1
N9 1 1 0
N10 1 1 1
N11 0 0 1
When probability (i.e., β) and impact (i.e., δ) values are
calculated, they are mapped to the qualitative scale as
follows:
[ 0, 0.5) → Negligible
[ 0.5, 1) → Extremely Low
[ 1, 1.5) → Very Low
[ 1.5, 2) → Low
[ 2, 2.5) → Below Average
[ 2.5, 3) → Above Average
[ 3, 3.5) → High
[ 3.5, 4) → Very High
[ 4, 4.5) → Extremely High
[ 4.5, 5]→ Not Recommended
Please note that this is a higher resolution scale with 10
values comparing to ENISA’s original five value qualitative
scale. We need a higher resolution scale to differentiate
CSPs because the adjusted probabilities of risk scenarios
are mostly below the average for the CSPs that answer
CAIQ. Those CSPs are clearly aware of the incident sce-
narios and implement at least a subset of the controls,
which are subject in CAIQ. Finally, by using the matrix in
Fig. 2—which is similar to but has a higher resolution than
thematrix in Fig. 1—the risk values for privacy Rr , security
Rs and service Re are obtained. Please note that these val-
ues are calculated for each CSP-CSC pair. Although, the
color codes in Fig. 2 are only for the three value qualita-
tive scale (i.e., Low < Medium < High) as in the ENISA’s
assessment, the quantative scale for the overall risk assess-
ment is also higher resolution (between 0 and 18 instead of
0 and 10) which is the result of selecting higher resolution
scales for probability and impact.
At this stage, the CSC provides CARAM with the maxi-
mum acceptable levels of risks for privacy Rrmax, security
Rsmax and service Rsmax. The CSC may also provide a set
U = {p1, . . . , pn} of CSPs that should be excluded from the
assessment due to reasons like business relations, politics,
past experience, etc. When this information is available,
CARAM creates a set F of feasible CSPs out of the set S of
all the CSPs available for assessment (i.e. CSPs that have a
completed CAIQ in STAR) such that F ⊂ S using Eq. 12.
pi ∈ F ⇐⇒ (pi /∈ U) ∧ (Rrmax > Rri)∧
(Rsmax > Rsi) ∧ (Remax > Rei) (12)
where Rri,Rsi and Rei are the privacy, security and service
risks for the CSP pi.
F can be an empty set, a set with only one element or
multiple elements. If F is an empty set, there is no feasi-
ble solution for the CSC. If F has only one element, that
is the only feasible solution for the CSC under the given
constraints. In both of these cases, CARAM informs the
CSC directly with the result. If F has multiple elements,
all the dominating CSPs are removed from F resulting
in the set F ′. Here we define the dominating relation 	:
CSP1 	 CSP2 ⇐⇒ Rri,Rsi and Rei for CSP1 are higher
than those for CSP2. If the resulting F ′ includes only one
CSP, CARAM informs the CSC about the solution that fits
the best to it. If there are multiple CSPs in F ′, the CSC is
given the complete F ′ for the posterior articulation of the
preferences.
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Probability
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Impact
Fig. 2 CARAM definition of risk levels
Experimental results
We prototyped CARAM and run experiments the data in
STAR [4] during the course of 2015. In this section we
present the results of these experiments (see Additional
file 2 — CARAM Experiments.xlsx for the detailed data).
Figures 3 and 4 illustrate the vulnerability index νi and
the adjusted probability βi values for the 44 CSPs included
in our analysis from STAR. These are calculated by the
CARAM prototype as explained in Section “Risk levels
computation”.
The differences between the vulnerability indices and
therefore the adjusted probabilities of various CSPs in
STAR are in the order of magnitude. For example, the
lowest vulnerability index is 0.011, which is the vulnera-
bility index of a CSP called as Iguana (we call the CSPs in
STAR database by using animal names to preserve their












Fig. 3 Vulnerability index νi for 44 CSPs in STAR
for the highest risk CSP (i.e., Gazelle) is 0.491. Although
the vulnerability index of Gazelle is more than 44 times
higher than the Iguana’s, it is less than 0.5. This means that
the probability value for the highest risk CSP in STAR will
be reduced more than 50 %, and become “LOW” accord-
ing to our higher resolution qualitative scale. This results
from the fact that the CSPs from STAR declare to imple-
ment the majority of controls. That makes sense because
the CSPs in STAR represent a subset of CSPs which are
putting an effort to reduce their risk. Their submission of
CAIQ is an indication for that.
Another interesting observation in Figs. 3 and 4 is about
the differences among privacy, security and service vul-
nerability index and adjusted probability for each CSP. The
differences among these three values are observable only
for few CSPs. This is an indication that the CSPs in STAR














Fig. 4 Adjusted probability βi for 44 CSPs in STAR
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typically treat them equally. This is coupled with the fact
that the categories of privacy, security and service risks are
overlapping, and the number of risks in the privacy, secu-
rity and service categories by our selection are almost the
same: 19, 22 and 22 respectively (see Table 7).
For our experiments, we considered five types of CSCs
based on the nature of their assets. We calculated the per-
centage of the risk incident scenarios that each asset is
related to the ENISA risk assessment. We noticed that the
following three assets are not related to any scenarios:A15
management interface APIs, A18 physical buildings, and
A19 cloud provider application (source code). We call any
asset related to at least 10 % of the incident scenarios as
highly exposed asset. Some assets are service-related and
some are data assets. Finally, data assets can be personal
or not personal. Based on these, we use the following five
types of CSCs in our experiments:
CSC1 have all the assets in the ENISA’s list.
CSC2 have all highly exposed assets.
CSC3 have all the data and service assets.
CSC4 have only data assets.
CSC5 have only personal data assets.
CARAM computes the privacy, security and service
impact values adjusted for these five classes of CSCs as
depicted in Fig. 5. As clearly shown, the privacy impact
of risk scenarios is somewhat higher than the service and
security impacts. This may be explained by the fact that
most of the risks directly or indirectly may impact an asset
related to privacy. Since the higher order CSCs (i.e., CSC5
is the highest order and CSC1 is the lowest order CSC)
have only a subset of the assets owned by the lower order
CSCs, their adjusted impact values are predictably lower.
In Figs. 6, 7 and 8 the risk levels for various CSC classes
and three CSPs, which have the lowest, average and the



































Fig. 6 Privacy risk for CSP-CSC pairs
part of the figures shows the CSC-CSP pairs with medium
level of risk, and the lighter part shows the CSC-CSP pairs
with low level of risk according to the ENISA’s qualitative
risk scale. The vertical axis of the figures gives the risk
level according to the CARAM’s higher resolution scale as
in Fig. 2. We cannot observe any CSC class and CSP (the
CSPs from STAR) pair that have high level of risk. This is
as expected because all the CSPs in STAR apply at least
half of the controls from the CSA CCM. The effects of
measures are also assessed in the cloud risk assessment of
CNIL [16]. Almost the same shift in risk levels is addressed
in [16]. CARAM’s difference from CNIL’s risk assessment
is that CARAM can take into account the effects of mea-
sures for specific CSC-CSP pairs. In Figs. 6, 7 and 8 it
can be observed that privacy risk is higher than the secu-
rity and the security risk is higher than the service risk.
The privacy risk is low only for CSC4 and CSC5 when the
CSPs with adjusted probability value below the average.
For all the other types of CSC-CSP pairs, the privacy risk
is medium.
Figures 7 and 8 indicate that the security and service
risk levels for almost all the CSPs in STAR is low for
CSC3,CSC4 and CSC5. When the CSC uses cloud also for
service assets (i.e., CSC3) the security and service risks for



















Fig. 7 Security risk for CSP-CSC pairs



















Fig. 8 Service risk for CSP-CSC pairs
medium. The security and service risks for CSC1 and
CSC2 are always medium for the CSPs in STAR.
Limitations
There are a few limitations that may impact the accuracy
of the results mainly stemming from the analyzed input
data, some of which were also outlined in [5]:
• Vague formulation of the CAIQ answers provided by
the analyzed CSPs: some CSPs avoid direct yes/no
answers to the CAIQ questions and use generic
wording instead;
• Possibility for deliberate misinformation in the CAIQ
answers provided by the analyzed CSPs: CSA has a
process of reporting misinformation in CSA
STAR [4];
• Ineffective implementation of the security controls by
the analyzed CSPs: only 3 of them have third party
certification from CSA and CSA does not provide a
detailed breakdown of scores for each control. To
address this additional methods for evaluating
control effectiveness are required, e.g. penetration
testing or analysis of previous incidents (see [24, 27]
for example approaches);
• In the CAIQ v1.1 [25] there is a misalignment
between the description of the security controls and
the actual questions that are querying their
implementation; this seems to be addressed though
by CSA in the newer version of CAIQ.
Notwithstanding, all results exposed in this paper are
verifiable and reproducible. Variations can be introduced
according to the interpretation of the cloud provider
answers. We favoured an impartial, automated classifi-
cation of the answers based on our training set. Smaller
scale uses of CARAM can reach much better precision in
the case of manual classification of the CSP answers to
the CAIQ questionnaire - which is time consuming but
doable and even advisable for some categories of CSCs.
Such manual check of the CSPs security practices can
sometimes be done in coordination between CSP and
CSC, what would lead to more transparency. As big cloud
players are unlikely to invest in such reviews, CSCs can
perhaps increase the pressure for (automated) continu-
ous monitoring of security controls, which would provide
more visibility to them on the security operations of the
providers.
Conclusion
CARAM is a qualitative and relative risk assessment
model for assisting CSCs to select a CSP that fits their
risk profile the best. It is based on the existing frameworks
such as ENISA, CAIQ and CNIL and complements them
to provide the CSC with a practical tool. It is a risk assess-
ment approach such that evaluation is carried out for a
specific CSC, which means assessment for each CSP-CSC
pair is for that pair and not generic. Moreover, the model
can be easily adapted to assess further risks scenarios
and/or security control frameworks, might they change in
the future. These multiple features make CARAM unique
with respect to the state of the art in risk assessment
techniques and also among other works proposing cloud
security metrics.
We have implemented a Proof-of-Concept prototype
as part of the Data Protection Impact Assessment tool
developed in A4Cloud project [28, 29]. The tool asks a
(potential) CSC to select a CSP from a given list of around
50 providers, which answered to the CAIQ and evalu-
ates a risk landscape of 35 risks from Table 1 grouped
into 3 categories: service, security and privacy using the
described methodology. Also the tool allows the CSCs to
compare the risk profiles of any two providers, thus help-
ing to select themost suitable CSP from the security point.
We performed the analysis of the risk profiles for 44 CSPs
from STAR and 5 imaginary classes of CSCs illustrating
the coverage of security controls by the different CSPs.
Endnote
1 The answers concerning the SAP HANA Enterprise
Cloud were only available to customers on demand.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Mapping CAIQ questions to vulnerabilities. This file
contains a table representing an example mapping rmk of CAIQ questions
to ENISA vulnerabilities (see Section The vulnerability parameter for a CSP).
This is the full version of the mapping provided in Table 6. (XLSX 16.6 kb)
Additional file 2: CARAM Experiments. This file contains the simulation
data (see Section Experimental results) including the risk values for several
classes of CSCs for all the analyzed CSPs from STAR. (XLSX 331 kb)
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